575 lines
19 KiB
Python
575 lines
19 KiB
Python
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# Copyright 2011-2012 Kjell Braden <afflux@pentabarf.de>
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#
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# This file is part of the python-potr library.
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#
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# python-potr is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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# it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
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# the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
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# any later version.
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#
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# python-potr is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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# GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
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#
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# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
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# along with this library. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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# some python3 compatibilty
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from __future__ import unicode_literals
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try:
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type(basestring)
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except NameError:
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# all strings are unicode in python3k
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basestring = str
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unicode = str
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# callable is not available in python 3.0 and 3.1
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try:
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type(callable)
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except NameError:
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from collections import Callable
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def callable(x):
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return isinstance(x, Callable)
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import base64
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import logging
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import struct
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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from potr import crypt
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from potr import proto
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from potr import compatcrypto
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from time import time
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EXC_UNREADABLE_MESSAGE = 1
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EXC_FINISHED = 2
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HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL = 60
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STATE_PLAINTEXT = 0
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STATE_ENCRYPTED = 1
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STATE_FINISHED = 2
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FRAGMENT_SEND_ALL = 0
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FRAGMENT_SEND_ALL_BUT_FIRST = 1
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FRAGMENT_SEND_ALL_BUT_LAST = 2
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OFFER_NOTSENT = 0
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OFFER_SENT = 1
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OFFER_REJECTED = 2
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OFFER_ACCEPTED = 3
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class Context(object):
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def __init__(self, account, peername):
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self.user = account
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self.peer = peername
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self.policy = {}
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self.crypto = crypt.CryptEngine(self)
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self.tagOffer = OFFER_NOTSENT
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self.mayRetransmit = 0
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self.lastSend = 0
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self.lastMessage = None
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self.state = STATE_PLAINTEXT
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self.trustName = self.peer
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self.fragmentInfo = None
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self.fragment = None
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self.discardFragment()
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def getPolicy(self, key):
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raise NotImplementedError
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def inject(self, msg, appdata=None):
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raise NotImplementedError
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def policyOtrEnabled(self):
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return self.getPolicy('ALLOW_V2') or self.getPolicy('ALLOW_V1')
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def discardFragment(self):
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self.fragmentInfo = (0, 0)
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self.fragment = []
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def fragmentAccumulate(self, message):
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'''Accumulate a fragmented message. Returns None if the fragment is
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to be ignored, returns a string if the message is ready for further
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processing'''
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params = message.split(b',')
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if len(params) < 5 or not params[1].isdigit() or not params[2].isdigit():
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logger.warning('invalid formed fragmented message: %r', params)
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self.discardFragment()
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return message
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K, N = self.fragmentInfo
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try:
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k = int(params[1])
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n = int(params[2])
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except ValueError:
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logger.warning('invalid formed fragmented message: %r', params)
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self.discardFragment()
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return message
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fragData = params[3]
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logger.debug(params)
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if n >= k == 1:
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# first fragment
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self.discardFragment()
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self.fragmentInfo = (k, n)
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self.fragment.append(fragData)
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elif N == n >= k > 1 and k == K+1:
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# accumulate
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self.fragmentInfo = (k, n)
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self.fragment.append(fragData)
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else:
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# bad, discard
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self.discardFragment()
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logger.warning('invalid fragmented message: %r', params)
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return message
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if n == k > 0:
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assembled = b''.join(self.fragment)
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self.discardFragment()
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return assembled
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return None
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def removeFingerprint(self, fingerprint):
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self.user.removeFingerprint(self.trustName, fingerprint)
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def setTrust(self, fingerprint, trustLevel):
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''' sets the trust level for the given fingerprint.
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trust is usually:
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- the empty string for known but untrusted keys
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- 'verified' for manually verified keys
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- 'smp' for smp-style verified keys '''
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self.user.setTrust(self.trustName, fingerprint, trustLevel)
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def getTrust(self, fingerprint, default=None):
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return self.user.getTrust(self.trustName, fingerprint, default)
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def setCurrentTrust(self, trustLevel):
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self.setTrust(self.crypto.theirPubkey.cfingerprint(), trustLevel)
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def getCurrentKey(self):
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return self.crypto.theirPubkey
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def getCurrentTrust(self):
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''' returns a 2-tuple: first element is the current fingerprint,
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second is:
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- None if the key is unknown yet
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- a non-empty string if the key is trusted
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- an empty string if the key is untrusted '''
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if self.crypto.theirPubkey is None:
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return None
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return self.getTrust(self.crypto.theirPubkey.cfingerprint(), None)
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def receiveMessage(self, messageData, appdata=None):
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IGN = None, []
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if not self.policyOtrEnabled():
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raise NotOTRMessage(messageData)
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message = self.parse(messageData)
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if message is None:
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# nothing to see. move along.
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return IGN
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logger.debug(repr(message))
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if self.getPolicy('SEND_TAG'):
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if isinstance(message, basestring):
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# received a plaintext message without tag
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# we should not tag anymore
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self.tagOffer = OFFER_REJECTED
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else:
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# got something OTR-ish, cool!
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self.tagOffer = OFFER_ACCEPTED
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if isinstance(message, proto.Query):
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self.handleQuery(message, appdata=appdata)
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if isinstance(message, proto.TaggedPlaintext):
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# it's actually a plaintext message
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if self.state != STATE_PLAINTEXT or \
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self.getPolicy('REQUIRE_ENCRYPTION'):
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# but we don't want plaintexts
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raise UnencryptedMessage(message.msg)
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raise NotOTRMessage(message.msg)
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return IGN
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if isinstance(message, proto.AKEMessage):
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self.crypto.handleAKE(message, appdata=appdata)
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return IGN
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if isinstance(message, proto.DataMessage):
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ignore = message.flags & proto.MSGFLAGS_IGNORE_UNREADABLE
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if self.state != STATE_ENCRYPTED:
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self.sendInternal(proto.Error(
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'You sent encrypted data, but I wasn\'t expecting it.'
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.encode('utf-8')), appdata=appdata)
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if ignore:
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return IGN
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raise NotEncryptedError(EXC_UNREADABLE_MESSAGE)
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try:
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plaintext, tlvs = self.crypto.handleDataMessage(message)
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self.processTLVs(tlvs, appdata=appdata)
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if plaintext and self.lastSend < time() - HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL:
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self.sendInternal(b'', appdata=appdata)
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return plaintext or None, tlvs
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except crypt.InvalidParameterError:
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if ignore:
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return IGN
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logger.exception('decryption failed')
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raise
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if isinstance(message, basestring):
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if self.state != STATE_PLAINTEXT or \
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self.getPolicy('REQUIRE_ENCRYPTION'):
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raise UnencryptedMessage(message)
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if isinstance(message, proto.Error):
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raise ErrorReceived(message)
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raise NotOTRMessage(messageData)
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def sendInternal(self, msg, tlvs=[], appdata=None):
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self.sendMessage(FRAGMENT_SEND_ALL, msg, tlvs=tlvs, appdata=appdata,
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flags=proto.MSGFLAGS_IGNORE_UNREADABLE)
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def sendMessage(self, sendPolicy, msg, flags=0, tlvs=[], appdata=None):
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if self.policyOtrEnabled():
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self.lastSend = time()
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if isinstance(msg, proto.OTRMessage):
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# we want to send a protocol message (probably internal)
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# so we don't need further protocol encryption
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# also we can't add TLVs to arbitrary protocol messages
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if tlvs:
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raise TypeError('can\'t add tlvs to protocol message')
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else:
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# we got plaintext to send. encrypt it
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msg = self.processOutgoingMessage(msg, flags, tlvs)
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if isinstance(msg, proto.OTRMessage) \
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and not isinstance(msg, proto.Query):
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# if it's a query message, it must not get fragmented
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return self.sendFragmented(bytes(msg), policy=sendPolicy, appdata=appdata)
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else:
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msg = bytes(msg)
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return msg
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def processOutgoingMessage(self, msg, flags, tlvs=[]):
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isQuery = self.parseExplicitQuery(msg) is not None
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if isQuery:
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return self.user.getDefaultQueryMessage(self.getPolicy)
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if self.state == STATE_PLAINTEXT:
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if self.getPolicy('REQUIRE_ENCRYPTION'):
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if not isQuery:
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self.lastMessage = msg
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self.lastSend = time()
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self.mayRetransmit = 2
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# TODO notify
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msg = self.user.getDefaultQueryMessage(self.getPolicy)
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return msg
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if self.getPolicy('SEND_TAG') and \
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self.tagOffer != OFFER_REJECTED and \
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self.shouldTagMessage(msg):
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self.tagOffer = OFFER_SENT
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versions = set()
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if self.getPolicy('ALLOW_V1'):
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versions.add(1)
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if self.getPolicy('ALLOW_V2'):
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versions.add(2)
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return proto.TaggedPlaintext(msg, versions)
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return msg
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if self.state == STATE_ENCRYPTED:
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msg = self.crypto.createDataMessage(msg, flags, tlvs)
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self.lastSend = time()
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return msg
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if self.state == STATE_FINISHED:
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raise NotEncryptedError(EXC_FINISHED)
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def disconnect(self, appdata=None):
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if self.state != STATE_FINISHED:
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self.sendInternal(b'', tlvs=[proto.DisconnectTLV()], appdata=appdata)
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self.setState(STATE_PLAINTEXT)
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self.crypto.finished()
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else:
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self.setState(STATE_PLAINTEXT)
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def setState(self, newstate):
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self.state = newstate
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def _wentEncrypted(self):
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self.setState(STATE_ENCRYPTED)
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def sendFragmented(self, msg, policy=FRAGMENT_SEND_ALL, appdata=None):
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mms = self.maxMessageSize(appdata)
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msgLen = len(msg)
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if mms != 0 and msgLen > mms:
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fms = mms - 19
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fragments = [ msg[i:i+fms] for i in range(0, msgLen, fms) ]
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fc = len(fragments)
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if fc > 65535:
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raise OverflowError('too many fragments')
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for fi in range(len(fragments)):
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ctr = unicode(fi+1) + ',' + unicode(fc) + ','
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fragments[fi] = b'?OTR,' + ctr.encode('ascii') \
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+ fragments[fi] + b','
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if policy == FRAGMENT_SEND_ALL:
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for f in fragments:
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self.inject(f, appdata=appdata)
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return None
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elif policy == FRAGMENT_SEND_ALL_BUT_FIRST:
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for f in fragments[1:]:
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self.inject(f, appdata=appdata)
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return fragments[0]
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elif policy == FRAGMENT_SEND_ALL_BUT_LAST:
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for f in fragments[:-1]:
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self.inject(f, appdata=appdata)
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return fragments[-1]
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else:
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if policy == FRAGMENT_SEND_ALL:
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self.inject(msg, appdata=appdata)
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return None
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else:
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return msg
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def processTLVs(self, tlvs, appdata=None):
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for tlv in tlvs:
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if isinstance(tlv, proto.DisconnectTLV):
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logger.info('got disconnect tlv, forcing finished state')
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self.setState(STATE_FINISHED)
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self.crypto.finished()
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# TODO cleanup
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continue
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if isinstance(tlv, proto.SMPTLV):
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self.crypto.smpHandle(tlv, appdata=appdata)
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continue
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logger.info('got unhandled tlv: {0!r}'.format(tlv))
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def smpAbort(self, appdata=None):
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if self.state != STATE_ENCRYPTED:
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raise NotEncryptedError
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self.crypto.smpAbort(appdata=appdata)
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def smpIsValid(self):
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return self.crypto.smp and self.crypto.smp.prog != crypt.SMPPROG_CHEATED
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def smpIsSuccess(self):
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return self.crypto.smp.prog == crypt.SMPPROG_SUCCEEDED \
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if self.crypto.smp else None
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def smpGotSecret(self, secret, question=None, appdata=None):
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if self.state != STATE_ENCRYPTED:
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raise NotEncryptedError
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self.crypto.smpSecret(secret, question=question, appdata=appdata)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def smpInit(self, secret, question=None, appdata=None):
|
||
|
|
if self.state != STATE_ENCRYPTED:
|
||
|
|
raise NotEncryptedError
|
||
|
|
self.crypto.smp = None
|
||
|
|
self.crypto.smpSecret(secret, question=question, appdata=appdata)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def handleQuery(self, message, appdata=None):
|
||
|
|
if 2 in message.versions and self.getPolicy('ALLOW_V2'):
|
||
|
|
self.authStartV2(appdata=appdata)
|
||
|
|
elif 1 in message.versions and self.getPolicy('ALLOW_V1'):
|
||
|
|
self.authStartV1(appdata=appdata)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def authStartV1(self, appdata=None):
|
||
|
|
raise NotImplementedError()
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def authStartV2(self, appdata=None):
|
||
|
|
self.crypto.startAKE(appdata=appdata)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def parseExplicitQuery(self, message):
|
||
|
|
otrTagPos = message.find(proto.OTRTAG)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
if otrTagPos == -1:
|
||
|
|
return None
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
indexBase = otrTagPos + len(proto.OTRTAG)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
if len(message) <= indexBase:
|
||
|
|
return None
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
compare = message[indexBase]
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
hasq = compare == b'?'[0]
|
||
|
|
hasv = compare == b'v'[0]
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
if not hasq and not hasv:
|
||
|
|
return None
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
hasv |= len(message) > indexBase+1 and message[indexBase+1] == b'v'[0]
|
||
|
|
if hasv:
|
||
|
|
end = message.find(b'?', indexBase+1)
|
||
|
|
else:
|
||
|
|
end = indexBase+1
|
||
|
|
return message[indexBase:end]
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def parse(self, message, nofragment=False):
|
||
|
|
otrTagPos = message.find(proto.OTRTAG)
|
||
|
|
if otrTagPos == -1:
|
||
|
|
if proto.MESSAGE_TAG_BASE in message:
|
||
|
|
return proto.TaggedPlaintext.parse(message)
|
||
|
|
else:
|
||
|
|
return message
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
indexBase = otrTagPos + len(proto.OTRTAG)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
if len(message) <= indexBase:
|
||
|
|
return message
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
compare = message[indexBase]
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
if nofragment is False and compare == b','[0]:
|
||
|
|
message = self.fragmentAccumulate(message[indexBase:])
|
||
|
|
if message is None:
|
||
|
|
return None
|
||
|
|
else:
|
||
|
|
return self.parse(message, nofragment=True)
|
||
|
|
else:
|
||
|
|
self.discardFragment()
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
queryPayload = self.parseExplicitQuery(message)
|
||
|
|
if queryPayload is not None:
|
||
|
|
return proto.Query.parse(queryPayload)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
if compare == b':'[0] and len(message) > indexBase + 4:
|
||
|
|
try:
|
||
|
|
infoTag = base64.b64decode(message[indexBase+1:indexBase+5])
|
||
|
|
classInfo = struct.unpack(b'!HB', infoTag)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
cls = proto.messageClasses.get(classInfo, None)
|
||
|
|
if cls is None:
|
||
|
|
return message
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
logger.debug('{user} got msg {typ!r}' \
|
||
|
|
.format(user=self.user.name, typ=cls))
|
||
|
|
return cls.parsePayload(message[indexBase+5:])
|
||
|
|
except (TypeError, struct.error):
|
||
|
|
logger.exception('could not parse OTR message %s', message)
|
||
|
|
return message
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
if message[indexBase:indexBase+7] == b' Error:':
|
||
|
|
return proto.Error(message[indexBase+7:])
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
return message
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def maxMessageSize(self, appdata=None):
|
||
|
|
"""Return the max message size for this context."""
|
||
|
|
return self.user.maxMessageSize
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def getExtraKey(self, extraKeyAppId=None, extraKeyAppData=None, appdata=None):
|
||
|
|
""" retrieves the generated extra symmetric key.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
if extraKeyAppId is set, notifies the chat partner about intended
|
||
|
|
usage (additional application specific information can be supplied in
|
||
|
|
extraKeyAppData).
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
returns the 256 bit symmetric key """
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
if self.state != STATE_ENCRYPTED:
|
||
|
|
raise NotEncryptedError
|
||
|
|
if extraKeyAppId is not None:
|
||
|
|
tlvs = [proto.ExtraKeyTLV(extraKeyAppId, extraKeyAppData)]
|
||
|
|
self.sendInternal(b'', tlvs=tlvs, appdata=appdata)
|
||
|
|
return self.crypto.extraKey
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def shouldTagMessage(self, msg):
|
||
|
|
"""Hook to decide whether to tag a message based on its contents."""
|
||
|
|
return True
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
class Account(object):
|
||
|
|
contextclass = Context
|
||
|
|
def __init__(self, name, protocol, maxMessageSize, privkey=None):
|
||
|
|
self.name = name
|
||
|
|
self.privkey = privkey
|
||
|
|
self.policy = {}
|
||
|
|
self.protocol = protocol
|
||
|
|
self.ctxs = {}
|
||
|
|
self.trusts = {}
|
||
|
|
self.maxMessageSize = maxMessageSize
|
||
|
|
self.defaultQuery = '?OTRv{versions}?\nI would like to start ' \
|
||
|
|
'an Off-the-Record private conversation. However, you ' \
|
||
|
|
'do not have a plugin to support that.\nSee '\
|
||
|
|
'https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/ for more information.'
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def __repr__(self):
|
||
|
|
return '<{cls}(name={name!r})>'.format(cls=self.__class__.__name__,
|
||
|
|
name=self.name)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def getPrivkey(self, autogen=True):
|
||
|
|
if self.privkey is None:
|
||
|
|
self.privkey = self.loadPrivkey()
|
||
|
|
if self.privkey is None:
|
||
|
|
if autogen is True:
|
||
|
|
self.privkey = compatcrypto.generateDefaultKey()
|
||
|
|
self.savePrivkey()
|
||
|
|
else:
|
||
|
|
raise LookupError
|
||
|
|
return self.privkey
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def loadPrivkey(self):
|
||
|
|
raise NotImplementedError
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def savePrivkey(self):
|
||
|
|
raise NotImplementedError
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def saveTrusts(self):
|
||
|
|
raise NotImplementedError
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def getContext(self, uid, newCtxCb=None):
|
||
|
|
if uid not in self.ctxs:
|
||
|
|
self.ctxs[uid] = self.contextclass(self, uid)
|
||
|
|
if callable(newCtxCb):
|
||
|
|
newCtxCb(self.ctxs[uid])
|
||
|
|
return self.ctxs[uid]
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def getDefaultQueryMessage(self, policy):
|
||
|
|
v = '2' if policy('ALLOW_V2') else ''
|
||
|
|
msg = self.defaultQuery.format(versions=v)
|
||
|
|
return msg.encode('ascii')
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def setTrust(self, key, fingerprint, trustLevel):
|
||
|
|
if key not in self.trusts:
|
||
|
|
self.trusts[key] = {}
|
||
|
|
self.trusts[key][fingerprint] = trustLevel
|
||
|
|
self.saveTrusts()
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def getTrust(self, key, fingerprint, default=None):
|
||
|
|
if key not in self.trusts:
|
||
|
|
return default
|
||
|
|
return self.trusts[key].get(fingerprint, default)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
def removeFingerprint(self, key, fingerprint):
|
||
|
|
if key in self.trusts and fingerprint in self.trusts[key]:
|
||
|
|
del self.trusts[key][fingerprint]
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
class NotEncryptedError(RuntimeError):
|
||
|
|
pass
|
||
|
|
class UnencryptedMessage(RuntimeError):
|
||
|
|
pass
|
||
|
|
class ErrorReceived(RuntimeError):
|
||
|
|
pass
|
||
|
|
class NotOTRMessage(RuntimeError):
|
||
|
|
pass
|