diff --git a/plugins/crypto-vala/CMakeLists.txt b/plugins/crypto-vala/CMakeLists.txt index 2c9f790a..036e45f6 100644 --- a/plugins/crypto-vala/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/plugins/crypto-vala/CMakeLists.txt @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ SOURCES "src/cipher.vala" "src/cipher_converter.vala" "src/error.vala" + "src/random.vala" CUSTOM_VAPIS "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/vapi/gcrypt.vapi" PACKAGES diff --git a/plugins/crypto-vala/src/random.vala b/plugins/crypto-vala/src/random.vala new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3f5d3ba9 --- /dev/null +++ b/plugins/crypto-vala/src/random.vala @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +namespace Crypto { +public static void randomize(uint8[] buffer) { + GCrypt.Random.randomize(buffer); +} +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/plugins/rtp/CMakeLists.txt b/plugins/rtp/CMakeLists.txt index 2b66f6ff..ef2f7698 100644 --- a/plugins/rtp/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/plugins/rtp/CMakeLists.txt @@ -18,18 +18,20 @@ SOURCES src/video_widget.vala src/register_plugin.vala CUSTOM_VAPIS + ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/exports/crypto-vala.vapi ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/exports/xmpp-vala.vapi ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/exports/dino.vapi ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/exports/qlite.vapi + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/src/srtp.vapi PACKAGES ${RTP_PACKAGES} OPTIONS --vapidir=${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/vapi ) -add_definitions(${VALA_CFLAGS} -DG_LOG_DOMAIN="rtp") -add_library(rtp SHARED ${RTP_VALA_C}) -target_link_libraries(rtp libdino ${RTP_PACKAGES}) +add_definitions(${VALA_CFLAGS} -DG_LOG_DOMAIN="rtp" -I${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/src) +add_library(rtp SHARED ${RTP_VALA_C} src/srtp.c) +target_link_libraries(rtp libdino crypto-vala ${RTP_PACKAGES}) set_target_properties(rtp PROPERTIES PREFIX "") set_target_properties(rtp PROPERTIES LIBRARY_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/plugins/) diff --git a/plugins/rtp/src/module.vala b/plugins/rtp/src/module.vala index 577e9f53..ecf7b658 100644 --- a/plugins/rtp/src/module.vala +++ b/plugins/rtp/src/module.vala @@ -200,65 +200,23 @@ public class Dino.Plugins.Rtp.Module : JingleRtp.Module { plugin.close_stream(rtp_stream); } -// public uint32 get_session_id(string id) { -// return (uint32) id.split("-")[0].to_int(); -// } -// -// public string create_feed(string media, bool incoming) { -// init(); -// string id = random_uuid(); -// if (media == "audio") { -// id = "0-" + id; -// } else { -// id = "1-" + id; -// } -// MediaDevice? device = plugin.get_preferred_device(media, incoming); -// Feed feed; -// if (incoming) { -// if (media == "audio") { -// feed = new IncomingAudioFeed(id, this, device); -// } else if (media == "video") { -// feed = new IncomingVideoFeed(id, this, device); -// } else { -// critical("Incoming feed of media '%s' not supported", media); -// return id; -// } -// } else { -// if (media == "audio") { -// string? matching_incoming_feed_id = null; -// foreach (Feed match in plugin.feeds.values) { -// if (match is IncomingAudioFeed) { -// matching_incoming_feed_id = match.id; -// } -// } -// feed = new OutgoingAudioFeed(id, this, device); -// } else if (media == "video") { -// feed = new OutgoingVideoFeed(id, this, device); -// } else { -// critical("Outgoing feed of media '%s' not supported", media); -// return id; -// } -// } -// plugin.add_feed(id, feed); -// return id; -// } -// -// public void connect_feed(string id, JingleRtp.PayloadType payload, Jingle.DatagramConnection connection) { -// if (!plugin.feeds.has_key(id)) { -// critical("Tried to connect feed with id %s, but no such feed found", id); -// return; -// } -// Feed feed = plugin.feeds[id]; -// feed.connect(payload, connection); -// } -// -// public void destroy_feed(string id) { -// if (!plugin.feeds.has_key(id)) { -// critical("Tried to destroy feed with id %s, but no such feed found", id); -// return; -// } -// Feed feed = plugin.feeds[id]; -// feed.destroy(); -// plugin.feeds.remove(id); -// } + public override JingleRtp.Crypto? generate_local_crypto() { + uint8[] keyAndSalt = new uint8[30]; + Crypto.randomize(keyAndSalt); + return JingleRtp.Crypto.create(JingleRtp.Crypto.AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80, keyAndSalt); + } + + public override JingleRtp.Crypto? pick_remote_crypto(Gee.List cryptos) { + foreach (JingleRtp.Crypto crypto in cryptos) { + if (crypto.is_valid) return crypto; + } + return null; + } + + public override JingleRtp.Crypto? pick_local_crypto(JingleRtp.Crypto? remote) { + if (remote == null || !remote.is_valid) return null; + uint8[] keyAndSalt = new uint8[30]; + Crypto.randomize(keyAndSalt); + return remote.rekey(keyAndSalt); + } } \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/plugins/rtp/src/srtp.c b/plugins/rtp/src/srtp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..708244d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/plugins/rtp/src/srtp.c @@ -0,0 +1,836 @@ +/* + * Secure RTP with libgcrypt + * Copyright (C) 2007 Rémi Denis-Courmont + * + * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either + * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + * Lesser General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA + */ + +/* TODO: + * Useless stuff (because nothing depends on it): + * - non-nul key derivation rate + * - MKI payload + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +# include +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include "srtp.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#ifdef _WIN32 +# include +#else +# include +#endif + +#define debug( ... ) (void)0 + +typedef struct srtp_proto_t +{ + gcry_cipher_hd_t cipher; + gcry_md_hd_t mac; + uint64_t window; + uint32_t salt[4]; +} srtp_proto_t; + +struct srtp_session_t +{ + srtp_proto_t rtp; + srtp_proto_t rtcp; + unsigned flags; + unsigned kdr; + uint32_t rtcp_index; + uint32_t rtp_roc; + uint16_t rtp_seq; + uint16_t rtp_rcc; + uint8_t tag_len; +}; + +enum +{ + SRTP_CRYPT, + SRTP_AUTH, + SRTP_SALT, + SRTCP_CRYPT, + SRTCP_AUTH, + SRTCP_SALT +}; + + +static inline unsigned rcc_mode (const srtp_session_t *s) +{ + return (s->flags >> 4) & 3; +} + + +static void proto_destroy (srtp_proto_t *p) +{ + gcry_md_close (p->mac); + gcry_cipher_close (p->cipher); +} + + +/** + * Releases all resources associated with a Secure RTP session. + */ +void srtp_destroy (srtp_session_t *s) +{ + assert (s != NULL); + + proto_destroy (&s->rtcp); + proto_destroy (&s->rtp); + free (s); +} + + +static int proto_create (srtp_proto_t *p, int gcipher, int gmd) +{ + if (gcry_cipher_open (&p->cipher, gcipher, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR, 0) == 0) + { + if (gcry_md_open (&p->mac, gmd, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC) == 0) + return 0; + gcry_cipher_close (p->cipher); + } + return -1; +} + + +/** + * Allocates a Secure RTP one-way session. + * The same session cannot be used both ways because this would confuse + * internal cryptographic counters; it is however of course feasible to open + * multiple simultaneous sessions with the same master key. + * + * @param encr encryption algorithm number + * @param auth authentication algortihm number + * @param tag_len authentication tag byte length (NOT including RCC) + * @param flags OR'ed optional flags. + * + * @return NULL in case of error + */ +srtp_session_t * +srtp_create (int encr, int auth, unsigned tag_len, int prf, unsigned flags) +{ + if ((flags & ~SRTP_FLAGS_MASK)) + return NULL; + + int cipher, md; + switch (encr) + { + case SRTP_ENCR_NULL: + cipher = GCRY_CIPHER_NONE; + break; + + case SRTP_ENCR_AES_CM: + cipher = GCRY_CIPHER_AES; + break; + + default: + return NULL; + } + + switch (auth) + { + case SRTP_AUTH_NULL: + md = GCRY_MD_NONE; + break; + + case SRTP_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1: + md = GCRY_MD_SHA1; + break; + + default: + return NULL; + } + + if (tag_len > gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (md)) + return NULL; + + if (prf != SRTP_PRF_AES_CM) + return NULL; + + srtp_session_t *s = malloc (sizeof (*s)); + if (s == NULL) + return NULL; + + memset (s, 0, sizeof (*s)); + s->flags = flags; + s->tag_len = tag_len; + s->rtp_rcc = 1; /* Default RCC rate */ + if (rcc_mode (s)) + { + if (tag_len < 4) + goto error; + } + + if (proto_create (&s->rtp, cipher, md) == 0) + { + if (proto_create (&s->rtcp, cipher, md) == 0) + return s; + proto_destroy (&s->rtp); + } + + error: + free (s); + return NULL; +} + + +/** + * Counter Mode encryption/decryption (ctr length = 16 bytes) + * with non-padded (truncated) text + */ +static int +do_ctr_crypt (gcry_cipher_hd_t hd, const void *ctr, uint8_t *data, size_t len) +{ + const size_t ctrlen = 16; + div_t d = div (len, ctrlen); + + if (gcry_cipher_setctr (hd, ctr, ctrlen) + || gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, data, d.quot * ctrlen, NULL, 0)) + return -1; + + if (d.rem) + { + /* Truncated last block */ + uint8_t dummy[ctrlen]; + data += d.quot * ctrlen; + memcpy (dummy, data, d.rem); + memset (dummy + d.rem, 0, ctrlen - d.rem); + + if (gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, dummy, ctrlen, data, ctrlen)) + return -1; + memcpy (data, dummy, d.rem); + } + + return 0; +} + + +/** + * AES-CM key derivation (saltlen = 14 bytes) + */ +static int +do_derive (gcry_cipher_hd_t prf, const void *salt, + const uint8_t *r, size_t rlen, uint8_t label, + void *out, size_t outlen) +{ + uint8_t iv[16]; + + memcpy (iv, salt, 14); + iv[14] = iv[15] = 0; + + assert (rlen < 14); + iv[13 - rlen] ^= label; + for (size_t i = 0; i < rlen; i++) + iv[sizeof (iv) - rlen + i] ^= r[i]; + + memset (out, 0, outlen); + return do_ctr_crypt (prf, iv, out, outlen); +} + + +/** + * Sets (or resets) the master key and master salt for a SRTP session. + * This must be done at least once before using srtp_send(), srtp_recv(), + * srtcp_send() or srtcp_recv(). Also, rekeying is required every + * 2^48 RTP packets or 2^31 RTCP packets (whichever comes first), + * otherwise the protocol security might be broken. + * + * @return 0 on success, in case of error: + * EINVAL invalid or unsupported key/salt sizes combination + */ +int +srtp_setkey (srtp_session_t *s, const void *key, size_t keylen, + const void *salt, size_t saltlen) +{ + /* SRTP/SRTCP cipher/salt/MAC keys derivation */ + gcry_cipher_hd_t prf; + uint8_t r[6], keybuf[20]; + + if (saltlen != 14) + return EINVAL; + + if (gcry_cipher_open (&prf, GCRY_CIPHER_AES, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR, 0) + || gcry_cipher_setkey (prf, key, keylen)) + return EINVAL; + + /* SRTP key derivation */ +#if 0 + if (s->kdr != 0) + { + uint64_t index = (((uint64_t)s->rtp_roc) << 16) | s->rtp_seq; + index /= s->kdr; + + for (int i = sizeof (r) - 1; i >= 0; i--) + { + r[i] = index & 0xff; + index = index >> 8; + } + } + else +#endif + memset (r, 0, sizeof (r)); + if (do_derive (prf, salt, r, 6, SRTP_CRYPT, keybuf, 16) + || gcry_cipher_setkey (s->rtp.cipher, keybuf, 16) + || do_derive (prf, salt, r, 6, SRTP_AUTH, keybuf, 20) + || gcry_md_setkey (s->rtp.mac, keybuf, 20) + || do_derive (prf, salt, r, 6, SRTP_SALT, s->rtp.salt, 14)) + return -1; + + /* SRTCP key derivation */ + memcpy (r, &(uint32_t){ htonl (s->rtcp_index) }, 4); + if (do_derive (prf, salt, r, 4, SRTCP_CRYPT, keybuf, 16) + || gcry_cipher_setkey (s->rtcp.cipher, keybuf, 16) + || do_derive (prf, salt, r, 4, SRTCP_AUTH, keybuf, 20) + || gcry_md_setkey (s->rtcp.mac, keybuf, 20) + || do_derive (prf, salt, r, 4, SRTCP_SALT, s->rtcp.salt, 14)) + return -1; + + (void)gcry_cipher_close (prf); + return 0; +} + +static int hexdigit (char c) +{ + if ((c >= '0') && (c <= '9')) + return c - '0'; + if ((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'F')) + return c - 'A' + 0xA; + if ((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'f')) + return c - 'a' + 0xa; + return -1; +} + +static ssize_t hexstring (const char *in, uint8_t *out, size_t outlen) +{ + size_t inlen = strlen (in); + + if ((inlen > (2 * outlen)) || (inlen & 1)) + return -1; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < inlen; i += 2) + { + int a = hexdigit (in[i]), b = hexdigit (in[i + 1]); + if ((a == -1) || (b == -1)) + return -1; + out[i / 2] = (a << 4) | b; + } + return inlen / 2; +} + +/** + * Sets (or resets) the master key and master salt for a SRTP session + * from hexadecimal strings. See also srtp_setkey(). + * + * @return 0 on success, in case of error: + * EINVAL invalid or unsupported key/salt sizes combination + */ +int +srtp_setkeystring (srtp_session_t *s, const char *key, const char *salt) +{ + uint8_t bkey[16]; /* TODO/NOTE: hard-coded for AES */ + uint8_t bsalt[14]; /* TODO/NOTE: hard-coded for the PRF-AES-CM */ + ssize_t bkeylen = hexstring (key, bkey, sizeof (bkey)); + ssize_t bsaltlen = hexstring (salt, bsalt, sizeof (bsalt)); + + if ((bkeylen == -1) || (bsaltlen == -1)) + return EINVAL; + return srtp_setkey (s, bkey, bkeylen, bsalt, bsaltlen) ? EINVAL : 0; +} + +/** + * Sets Roll-over-Counter Carry (RCC) rate for the SRTP session. If not + * specified (through this function), the default rate of ONE is assumed + * (i.e. every RTP packets will carry the RoC). RCC rate is ignored if none + * of the RCC mode has been selected. + * + * The RCC mode is selected through one of these flags for srtp_create(): + * SRTP_RCC_MODE1: integrity protection only for RoC carrying packets + * SRTP_RCC_MODE2: integrity protection for all packets + * SRTP_RCC_MODE3: no integrity protection + * + * RCC mode 3 is insecure. Compared to plain RTP, it provides confidentiality + * (through encryption) but is much more prone to DoS. It can only be used if + * anti-spoofing protection is provided by lower network layers (e.g. IPsec, + * or trusted routers and proper source address filtering). + * + * If RCC rate is 1, RCC mode 1 and 2 are functionally identical. + * + * @param rate RoC Carry rate (MUST NOT be zero) + */ +void srtp_setrcc_rate (srtp_session_t *s, uint16_t rate) +{ + assert (rate != 0); + s->rtp_rcc = rate; +} + + +/** AES-CM for RTP (salt = 14 bytes + 2 nul bytes) */ +static int +rtp_crypt (gcry_cipher_hd_t hd, uint32_t ssrc, uint32_t roc, uint16_t seq, + const uint32_t *salt, uint8_t *data, size_t len) +{ + /* Determines cryptographic counter (IV) */ + uint32_t counter[4]; + counter[0] = salt[0]; + counter[1] = salt[1] ^ ssrc; + counter[2] = salt[2] ^ htonl (roc); + counter[3] = salt[3] ^ htonl (seq << 16); + + /* Encryption */ + return do_ctr_crypt (hd, counter, data, len); +} + + +/** Determines SRTP Roll-Over-Counter (in host-byte order) */ +static uint32_t +srtp_compute_roc (const srtp_session_t *s, uint16_t seq) +{ + uint32_t roc = s->rtp_roc; + + if (((seq - s->rtp_seq) & 0xffff) < 0x8000) + { + /* Sequence is ahead, good */ + if (seq < s->rtp_seq) + roc++; /* Sequence number wrap */ + } + else + { + /* Sequence is late, bad */ + if (seq > s->rtp_seq) + roc--; /* Wrap back */ + } + return roc; +} + + +/** Returns RTP sequence (in host-byte order) */ +static inline uint16_t rtp_seq (const uint8_t *buf) +{ + return (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]; +} + + +/** Message Authentication and Integrity for RTP */ +static const uint8_t * +rtp_digest (gcry_md_hd_t md, const uint8_t *data, size_t len, + uint32_t roc) +{ + gcry_md_reset (md); + gcry_md_write (md, data, len); + gcry_md_write (md, &(uint32_t){ htonl (roc) }, 4); + return gcry_md_read (md, 0); +} + + +/** + * Encrypts/decrypts a RTP packet and updates SRTP context + * (CTR block cypher mode of operation has identical encryption and + * decryption function). + * + * @param buf RTP packet to be en-/decrypted + * @param len RTP packet length + * + * @return 0 on success, in case of error: + * EINVAL malformatted RTP packet + * EACCES replayed packet or out-of-window or sync lost + */ +static int srtp_crypt (srtp_session_t *s, uint8_t *buf, size_t len) +{ + assert (s != NULL); + assert (len >= 12u); + + if ((buf[0] >> 6) != 2) + return EINVAL; + + /* Computes encryption offset */ + uint16_t offset = 12; + offset += (buf[0] & 0xf) * 4; // skips CSRC + + if (buf[0] & 0x10) + { + uint16_t extlen; + + offset += 4; + if (len < offset) + return EINVAL; + + memcpy (&extlen, buf + offset - 2, 2); + offset += htons (extlen); // skips RTP extension header + } + + if (len < offset) + return EINVAL; + + /* Determines RTP 48-bits counter and SSRC */ + uint16_t seq = rtp_seq (buf); + uint32_t roc = srtp_compute_roc (s, seq), ssrc; + memcpy (&ssrc, buf + 8, 4); + + /* Updates ROC and sequence (it's safe now) */ + int16_t diff = seq - s->rtp_seq; + if (diff > 0) + { + /* Sequence in the future, good */ + s->rtp.window = s->rtp.window << diff; + s->rtp.window |= UINT64_C(1); + s->rtp_seq = seq, s->rtp_roc = roc; + } + else + { + /* Sequence in the past/present, bad */ + diff = -diff; + if ((diff >= 64) || ((s->rtp.window >> diff) & 1)) + return EACCES; /* Replay attack */ + s->rtp.window |= UINT64_C(1) << diff; + } + + /* Encrypt/Decrypt */ + if (s->flags & SRTP_UNENCRYPTED) + return 0; + + if (rtp_crypt (s->rtp.cipher, ssrc, roc, seq, s->rtp.salt, + buf + offset, len - offset)) + return EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + + +/** + * Turns a RTP packet into a SRTP packet: encrypt it, then computes + * the authentication tag and appends it. + * Note that you can encrypt packet in disorder. + * + * @param buf RTP packet to be encrypted/digested + * @param lenp pointer to the RTP packet length on entry, + * set to the SRTP length on exit (undefined on non-ENOSPC error) + * @param bufsize size (bytes) of the packet buffer + * + * @return 0 on success, in case of error: + * EINVAL malformatted RTP packet or internal error + * ENOSPC bufsize is too small to add authentication tag + * ( will hold the required byte size) + * EACCES packet would trigger a replay error on receiver + */ +int +srtp_send (srtp_session_t *s, uint8_t *buf, size_t *lenp, size_t bufsize) +{ + size_t len = *lenp; + size_t tag_len; + size_t roc_len = 0; + + /* Compute required buffer size */ + if (len < 12u) + return EINVAL; + + if (!(s->flags & SRTP_UNAUTHENTICATED)) + { + tag_len = s->tag_len; + + if (rcc_mode (s)) + { + assert (tag_len >= 4); + assert (s->rtp_rcc != 0); + if ((rtp_seq (buf) % s->rtp_rcc) == 0) + { + roc_len = 4; + if (rcc_mode (s) == 3) + tag_len = 0; /* RCC mode 3 -> no auth*/ + else + tag_len -= 4; /* RCC mode 1 or 2 -> auth*/ + } + else + { + if (rcc_mode (s) & 1) + tag_len = 0; /* RCC mode 1 or 3 -> no auth */ + } + } + + *lenp = len + roc_len + tag_len; + } + else + tag_len = 0; + + if (bufsize < *lenp) + return ENOSPC; + + /* Encrypt payload */ + int val = srtp_crypt (s, buf, len); + if (val) + return val; + + /* Authenticate payload */ + if (!(s->flags & SRTP_UNAUTHENTICATED)) + { + uint32_t roc = srtp_compute_roc (s, rtp_seq (buf)); + const uint8_t *tag = rtp_digest (s->rtp.mac, buf, len, roc); + + if (roc_len) + { + memcpy (buf + len, &(uint32_t){ htonl (s->rtp_roc) }, 4); + len += 4; + } + memcpy (buf + len, tag, tag_len); +#if 0 + printf ("Sent : 0x"); + for (unsigned i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) + printf ("%02x", tag[i]); + puts (""); +#endif + } + + return 0; +} + + +/** + * Turns a SRTP packet into a RTP packet: authenticates the packet, + * then decrypts it. + * + * @param buf RTP packet to be digested/decrypted + * @param lenp pointer to the SRTP packet length on entry, + * set to the RTP length on exit (undefined in case of error) + * + * @return 0 on success, in case of error: + * EINVAL malformatted SRTP packet + * EACCES authentication failed (spoofed packet or out-of-sync) + */ +int +srtp_recv (srtp_session_t *s, uint8_t *buf, size_t *lenp) +{ + size_t len = *lenp; + if (len < 12u) + return EINVAL; + + if (!(s->flags & SRTP_UNAUTHENTICATED)) + { + size_t tag_len = s->tag_len, roc_len = 0; + if (rcc_mode (s)) + { + if ((rtp_seq (buf) % s->rtp_rcc) == 0) + { + roc_len = 4; + if (rcc_mode (s) == 3) + tag_len = 0; + else + tag_len -= 4; + } + else + { + if (rcc_mode (s) & 1) + tag_len = 0; // RCC mode 1 or 3: no auth + } + } + + if (len < (12u + roc_len + tag_len)) + return EINVAL; + len -= roc_len + tag_len; + + uint32_t roc = srtp_compute_roc (s, rtp_seq (buf)), rcc; + if (roc_len) + { + assert (roc_len == 4); + memcpy (&rcc, buf + len, 4); + rcc = ntohl (rcc); + } + else + rcc = roc; + + const uint8_t *tag = rtp_digest (s->rtp.mac, buf, len, rcc); +#if 0 + printf ("Computed: 0x"); + for (unsigned i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) + printf ("%02x", tag[i]); + printf ("\nReceived: 0x"); + for (unsigned i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) + printf ("%02x", buf[len + roc_len + i]); + puts (""); +#endif + if (memcmp (buf + len + roc_len, tag, tag_len)) + return EACCES; + + if (roc_len) + { + /* Authenticated packet carried a Roll-Over-Counter */ + s->rtp_roc += rcc - roc; + assert (srtp_compute_roc (s, rtp_seq (buf)) == rcc); + } + *lenp = len; + } + + return srtp_crypt (s, buf, len); +} + + +/** AES-CM for RTCP (salt = 14 bytes + 2 nul bytes) */ +static int +rtcp_crypt (gcry_cipher_hd_t hd, uint32_t ssrc, uint32_t index, + const uint32_t *salt, uint8_t *data, size_t len) +{ + return rtp_crypt (hd, ssrc, index >> 16, index & 0xffff, salt, data, len); +} + + +/** Message Authentication and Integrity for RTCP */ +static const uint8_t * +rtcp_digest (gcry_md_hd_t md, const void *data, size_t len) +{ + gcry_md_reset (md); + gcry_md_write (md, data, len); + return gcry_md_read (md, 0); +} + + +/** + * Encrypts/decrypts a RTCP packet and updates SRTCP context + * (CTR block cypher mode of operation has identical encryption and + * decryption function). + * + * @param buf RTCP packet to be en-/decrypted + * @param len RTCP packet length + * + * @return 0 on success, in case of error: + * EINVAL malformatted RTCP packet + */ +static int srtcp_crypt (srtp_session_t *s, uint8_t *buf, size_t len) +{ + assert (s != NULL); + + /* 8-bytes unencrypted header, and 4-bytes unencrypted footer */ + if ((len < 12) || ((buf[0] >> 6) != 2)) + return EINVAL; + + uint32_t index; + memcpy (&index, buf + len, 4); + index = ntohl (index); + if (((index >> 31) != 0) != ((s->flags & SRTCP_UNENCRYPTED) == 0)) + return EINVAL; // E-bit mismatch + + index &= ~(1 << 31); // clear E-bit for counter + + /* Updates SRTCP index (safe here) */ + int32_t diff = index - s->rtcp_index; + if (diff > 0) + { + /* Packet in the future, good */ + s->rtcp.window = s->rtcp.window << diff; + s->rtcp.window |= UINT64_C(1); + s->rtcp_index = index; + } + else + { + /* Packet in the past/present, bad */ + diff = -diff; + if ((diff >= 64) || ((s->rtcp.window >> diff) & 1)) + return EACCES; // replay attack! + s->rtp.window |= UINT64_C(1) << diff; + } + + /* Crypts SRTCP */ + if (s->flags & SRTCP_UNENCRYPTED) + return 0; + + uint32_t ssrc; + memcpy (&ssrc, buf + 4, 4); + + if (rtcp_crypt (s->rtcp.cipher, ssrc, index, s->rtp.salt, + buf + 8, len - 8)) + return EINVAL; + return 0; +} + + +/** + * Turns a RTCP packet into a SRTCP packet: encrypt it, then computes + * the authentication tag and appends it. + * + * @param buf RTCP packet to be encrypted/digested + * @param lenp pointer to the RTCP packet length on entry, + * set to the SRTCP length on exit (undefined in case of error) + * @param bufsize size (bytes) of the packet buffer + * + * @return 0 on success, in case of error: + * EINVAL malformatted RTCP packet or internal error + * ENOSPC bufsize is too small (to add index and authentication tag) + */ +int +srtcp_send (srtp_session_t *s, uint8_t *buf, size_t *lenp, size_t bufsize) +{ + size_t len = *lenp; + if (bufsize < (len + 4 + s->tag_len)) + return ENOSPC; + + uint32_t index = ++s->rtcp_index; + if (index >> 31) + s->rtcp_index = index = 0; /* 31-bit wrap */ + + if ((s->flags & SRTCP_UNENCRYPTED) == 0) + index |= 0x80000000; /* Set Encrypted bit */ + memcpy (buf + len, &(uint32_t){ htonl (index) }, 4); + + int val = srtcp_crypt (s, buf, len); + if (val) + return val; + + len += 4; /* Digests SRTCP index too */ + + const uint8_t *tag = rtcp_digest (s->rtcp.mac, buf, len); + memcpy (buf + len, tag, s->tag_len); + *lenp = len + s->tag_len; + return 0; +} + + +/** + * Turns a SRTCP packet into a RTCP packet: authenticates the packet, + * then decrypts it. + * + * @param buf RTCP packet to be digested/decrypted + * @param lenp pointer to the SRTCP packet length on entry, + * set to the RTCP length on exit (undefined in case of error) + * + * @return 0 on success, in case of error: + * EINVAL malformatted SRTCP packet + * EACCES authentication failed (spoofed packet or out-of-sync) + */ +int +srtcp_recv (srtp_session_t *s, uint8_t *buf, size_t *lenp) +{ + size_t len = *lenp; + + if (len < (4u + s->tag_len)) + return EINVAL; + len -= s->tag_len; + + const uint8_t *tag = rtcp_digest (s->rtcp.mac, buf, len); + if (memcmp (buf + len, tag, s->tag_len)) + return EACCES; + + len -= 4; /* Remove SRTCP index before decryption */ + *lenp = len; + return srtcp_crypt (s, buf, len); +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/plugins/rtp/src/srtp.h b/plugins/rtp/src/srtp.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..abca6988 --- /dev/null +++ b/plugins/rtp/src/srtp.h @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/* + * Secure RTP with libgcrypt + * Copyright (C) 2007 Rémi Denis-Courmont + * + * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 + * of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef LIBVLC_SRTP_H +# define LIBVLC_SRTP_H 1 +#include + +typedef struct srtp_session_t srtp_session_t; + +enum +{ + SRTP_UNENCRYPTED=0x1, //< do not encrypt SRTP packets + SRTCP_UNENCRYPTED=0x2, //< do not encrypt SRTCP packets + SRTP_UNAUTHENTICATED=0x4, //< authenticate only SRTCP packets + + SRTP_RCC_MODE1=0x10, //< use Roll-over-Counter Carry mode 1 + SRTP_RCC_MODE2=0x20, //< use Roll-over-Counter Carry mode 2 + SRTP_RCC_MODE3=0x30, //< use Roll-over-Counter Carry mode 3 (insecure) + + SRTP_FLAGS_MASK=0x37 //< mask for valid flags +}; + +/** SRTP encryption algorithms (ciphers); same values as MIKEY */ +enum +{ + SRTP_ENCR_NULL=0, //< no encryption + SRTP_ENCR_AES_CM=1, //< AES counter mode + SRTP_ENCR_AES_F8=2, //< AES F8 mode (not implemented) +}; + +/** SRTP authenticaton algorithms; same values as MIKEY */ +enum +{ + SRTP_AUTH_NULL=0, //< no authentication code + SRTP_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1=1, //< HMAC-SHA1 +}; + +/** SRTP pseudo random function; same values as MIKEY */ +enum +{ + SRTP_PRF_AES_CM=0, //< AES counter mode +}; + +# ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +# endif + +srtp_session_t *srtp_create (int encr, int auth, unsigned tag_len, int prf, + unsigned flags); +void srtp_destroy (srtp_session_t *s); + +int srtp_setkey (srtp_session_t *s, const void *key, size_t keylen, + const void *salt, size_t saltlen); +int srtp_setkeystring (srtp_session_t *s, const char *key, const char *salt); + +void srtp_setrcc_rate (srtp_session_t *s, uint16_t rate); + +int srtp_send (srtp_session_t *s, uint8_t *buf, size_t *lenp, size_t maxsize); +int srtp_recv (srtp_session_t *s, uint8_t *buf, size_t *lenp); +int srtcp_send (srtp_session_t *s, uint8_t *buf, size_t *lenp, size_t maxsiz); +int srtcp_recv (srtp_session_t *s, uint8_t *buf, size_t *lenp); + +# ifdef __cplusplus +} +# endif +#endif \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/plugins/rtp/src/srtp.vapi b/plugins/rtp/src/srtp.vapi new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c5ce7fec --- /dev/null +++ b/plugins/rtp/src/srtp.vapi @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +[Compact] +[CCode (cname = "srtp_session_t", free_function = "srtp_destroy", cheader_filename="srtp.h")] +public class Dino.Plugins.Rtp.SrtpSession { + [CCode (cname = "srtp_create")] + public SrtpSession(SrtpEncryption encr, SrtpAuthentication auth, uint tag_len, SrtpPrf prf, SrtpFlags flags); + [CCode (cname = "srtp_setkey")] + public int setkey(uint8[] key, uint8[] salt); + [CCode (cname = "srtp_setkeystring")] + public int setkeystring(string key, string salt); + [CCode (cname = "srtp_setrcc_rate")] + public void setrcc_rate(uint16 rate); + + [CCode (cname = "srtp_send")] + private int rtp_send([CCode (array_length = false)] uint8[] buf, ref size_t len, size_t maxsize); + [CCode (cname = "srtcp_send")] + private int rtcp_send([CCode (array_length = false)] uint8[] buf, ref size_t len, size_t maxsize); + [CCode (cname = "srtp_recv")] + private int rtp_recv([CCode (array_length = false)] uint8[] buf, ref size_t len); + [CCode (cname = "srtcp_recv")] + private int rtcp_recv([CCode (array_length = false)] uint8[] buf, ref size_t len); + + public uint8[] encrypt_rtp(uint8[] input, uint tag_len = 10) throws GLib.Error { + uint8[] buf = new uint8[input.length+tag_len]; + GLib.Memory.copy(buf, input, input.length); + size_t buf_use = input.length; + int res = rtp_send(buf, ref buf_use, buf.length); + if (res != 0) { + throw new GLib.Error(-1, res, "RTP encrypt failed"); + } + uint8[] ret = new uint8[buf_use]; + GLib.Memory.copy(ret, buf, buf_use); + return ret; + } + + public uint8[] encrypt_rtcp(uint8[] input, uint tag_len = 10) throws GLib.Error { + uint8[] buf = new uint8[input.length+tag_len+4]; + GLib.Memory.copy(buf, input, input.length); + size_t buf_use = input.length; + int res = rtcp_send(buf, ref buf_use, buf.length); + if (res != 0) { + throw new GLib.Error(-1, res, "RTCP encrypt failed"); + } + uint8[] ret = new uint8[buf_use]; + GLib.Memory.copy(ret, buf, buf_use); + return ret; + } + + public uint8[] decrypt_rtp(uint8[] input) throws GLib.Error { + uint8[] buf = new uint8[input.length]; + GLib.Memory.copy(buf, input, input.length); + size_t buf_use = input.length; + int res = rtp_recv(buf, ref buf_use); + if (res != 0) { + throw new GLib.Error(-1, res, "RTP decrypt failed"); + } + uint8[] ret = new uint8[buf_use]; + GLib.Memory.copy(ret, buf, buf_use); + return ret; + } + + public uint8[] decrypt_rtcp(uint8[] input) throws GLib.Error { + uint8[] buf = new uint8[input.length]; + GLib.Memory.copy(buf, input, input.length); + size_t buf_use = input.length; + int res = rtcp_recv(buf, ref buf_use); + if (res != 0) { + throw new GLib.Error(-1, res, "RTCP decrypt failed"); + } + uint8[] ret = new uint8[buf_use]; + GLib.Memory.copy(ret, buf, buf_use); + return ret; + } +} + +[Flags] +[CCode (cname = "unsigned", cprefix = "", cheader_filename="srtp.h", has_type_id = false)] +public enum Dino.Plugins.Rtp.SrtpFlags { + SRTP_UNENCRYPTED, + SRTCP_UNENCRYPTED, + SRTP_UNAUTHENTICATED, + + SRTP_RCC_MODE1, + SRTP_RCC_MODE2, + SRTP_RCC_MODE3 +} + +[CCode (cname = "int", cprefix = "SRTP_ENCR_", cheader_filename="srtp.h", has_type_id = false)] +public enum Dino.Plugins.Rtp.SrtpEncryption { + NULL, + AES_CM, + AES_F8 +} + +[CCode (cname = "int", cprefix = "SRTP_AUTH_", cheader_filename="srtp.h", has_type_id = false)] +public enum Dino.Plugins.Rtp.SrtpAuthentication { + NULL, + HMAC_SHA1 +} + +[CCode (cname = "int", cprefix = "SRTP_PRF_", cheader_filename="srtp.h", has_type_id = false)] +public enum Dino.Plugins.Rtp.SrtpPrf { + AES_CM +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/plugins/rtp/src/stream.vala b/plugins/rtp/src/stream.vala index aea2fe85..362e2d16 100644 --- a/plugins/rtp/src/stream.vala +++ b/plugins/rtp/src/stream.vala @@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ public class Dino.Plugins.Rtp.Stream : Xmpp.Xep.JingleRtp.Stream { private Gst.Pad send_rtp_sink_pad; private Gst.Pad send_rtp_src_pad; + private SrtpSession? local_crypto_session; + private SrtpSession? remote_crypto_session; + public Stream(Plugin plugin, Xmpp.Xep.Jingle.Content content) { base(content); this.plugin = plugin; @@ -144,6 +147,20 @@ public class Dino.Plugins.Rtp.Stream : Xmpp.Xep.JingleRtp.Stream { plugin.unpause(); } + private void prepare_local_crypto() { + if (local_crypto != null && local_crypto_session == null) { + local_crypto_session = new SrtpSession( + local_crypto.crypto_suite == Xep.JingleRtp.Crypto.F8_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 ? SrtpEncryption.AES_F8 : SrtpEncryption.AES_CM, + SrtpAuthentication.HMAC_SHA1, + local_crypto.crypto_suite == Xep.JingleRtp.Crypto.AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32 ? 4 : 10, + SrtpPrf.AES_CM, + 0 + ); + local_crypto_session.setkey(local_crypto.key, local_crypto.salt); + debug("Setting up encryption with key params %s", local_crypto.key_params); + } + } + private Gst.FlowReturn on_new_sample(Gst.App.Sink sink) { if (sink == null) { debug("Sink is null"); @@ -153,9 +170,16 @@ public class Dino.Plugins.Rtp.Stream : Xmpp.Xep.JingleRtp.Stream { Gst.Buffer buffer = sample.get_buffer(); uint8[] data; buffer.extract_dup(0, buffer.get_size(), out data); + prepare_local_crypto(); if (sink == send_rtp) { + if (local_crypto_session != null) { + data = local_crypto_session.encrypt_rtp(data, local_crypto.crypto_suite == Xep.JingleRtp.Crypto.AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32 ? 4 : 10); + } on_send_rtp_data(new Bytes.take(data)); } else if (sink == send_rtcp) { + if (local_crypto_session != null) { + data = local_crypto_session.encrypt_rtcp(data, local_crypto.crypto_suite == Xep.JingleRtp.Crypto.AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32 ? 4 : 10); + } on_send_rtcp_data(new Bytes.take(data)); } else { warning("unknown sample"); @@ -258,15 +282,47 @@ public class Dino.Plugins.Rtp.Stream : Xmpp.Xep.JingleRtp.Stream { recv_rtp_src_pad = null; } + private void prepare_remote_crypto() { + if (remote_crypto != null && remote_crypto_session == null) { + remote_crypto_session = new SrtpSession( + remote_crypto.crypto_suite == Xep.JingleRtp.Crypto.F8_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 ? SrtpEncryption.AES_F8 : SrtpEncryption.AES_CM, + SrtpAuthentication.HMAC_SHA1, + remote_crypto.crypto_suite == Xep.JingleRtp.Crypto.AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32 ? 4 : 10, + SrtpPrf.AES_CM, + 0 + ); + remote_crypto_session.setkey(remote_crypto.key, remote_crypto.salt); + debug("Setting up decryption with key params %s", remote_crypto.key_params); + } + } + public override void on_recv_rtp_data(Bytes bytes) { + prepare_remote_crypto(); + uint8[] data = bytes.get_data(); + if (remote_crypto_session != null) { + try { + data = remote_crypto_session.decrypt_rtp(data); + } catch (Error e) { + warning("%s (%d)", e.message, e.code); + } + } if (push_recv_data) { - recv_rtp.push_buffer(new Gst.Buffer.wrapped_bytes(bytes)); + recv_rtp.push_buffer(new Gst.Buffer.wrapped((owned) data)); } } public override void on_recv_rtcp_data(Bytes bytes) { + prepare_remote_crypto(); + uint8[] data = bytes.get_data(); + if (remote_crypto_session != null) { + try { + data = remote_crypto_session.decrypt_rtcp(data); + } catch (Error e) { + warning("%s (%d)", e.message, e.code); + } + } if (push_recv_data) { - recv_rtcp.push_buffer(new Gst.Buffer.wrapped_bytes(bytes)); + recv_rtcp.push_buffer(new Gst.Buffer.wrapped((owned) data)); } } diff --git a/xmpp-vala/src/module/xep/0167_jingle_rtp/content_parameters.vala b/xmpp-vala/src/module/xep/0167_jingle_rtp/content_parameters.vala index 8a3668b2..cca03543 100644 --- a/xmpp-vala/src/module/xep/0167_jingle_rtp/content_parameters.vala +++ b/xmpp-vala/src/module/xep/0167_jingle_rtp/content_parameters.vala @@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ public class Xmpp.Xep.JingleRtp.Parameters : Jingle.ContentParameters, Object { public bool encryption_required { get; private set; default = false; } public PayloadType? agreed_payload_type { get; private set; } public Gee.List payload_types = new ArrayList(PayloadType.equals_func); - public Gee.List cryptos = new ArrayList(); + public Gee.List remote_cryptos = new ArrayList(); + public Crypto? local_crypto = null; + public Crypto? remote_crypto = null; public weak Stream? stream { get; private set; } @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ public class Xmpp.Xep.JingleRtp.Parameters : Jingle.ContentParameters, Object { string media, Gee.List payload_types, string? ssrc = null, bool rtcp_mux = false, string? bandwidth = null, string? bandwidth_type = null, - bool encryption_required = false, Gee.List cryptos = new ArrayList() + bool encryption_required = false, Crypto? local_crypto = null ) { this.parent = parent; this.media = media; @@ -37,7 +39,7 @@ public class Xmpp.Xep.JingleRtp.Parameters : Jingle.ContentParameters, Object { this.bandwidth_type = bandwidth_type; this.encryption_required = encryption_required; this.payload_types = payload_types; - this.cryptos = cryptos; + this.local_crypto = local_crypto; } public Parameters.from_node(Module parent, StanzaNode node) throws Jingle.IqError { @@ -49,7 +51,7 @@ public class Xmpp.Xep.JingleRtp.Parameters : Jingle.ContentParameters, Object { if (encryption != null) { this.encryption_required = encryption.get_attribute_bool("required", this.encryption_required); foreach (StanzaNode crypto in encryption.get_subnodes("crypto")) { - this.cryptos.add(Crypto.parse(crypto)); + this.remote_cryptos.add(Crypto.parse(crypto)); } } foreach (StanzaNode payloadType in node.get_subnodes("payload-type")) { @@ -64,6 +66,15 @@ public class Xmpp.Xep.JingleRtp.Parameters : Jingle.ContentParameters, Object { content.reject(); return; } + remote_crypto = parent.pick_remote_crypto(remote_cryptos); + if (local_crypto == null && remote_crypto != null) { + local_crypto = parent.pick_local_crypto(remote_crypto); + } + if ((local_crypto == null || remote_crypto == null) && encryption_required) { + debug("no usable encryption, but encryption required"); + content.reject(); + return; + } } public void accept(XmppStream stream, Jingle.Session session, Jingle.Content content) { @@ -97,6 +108,15 @@ public class Xmpp.Xep.JingleRtp.Parameters : Jingle.ContentParameters, Object { } }); + if (remote_crypto == null || local_crypto == null) { + if (encryption_required) { + warning("Encryption required but not provided in both directions"); + return; + } + remote_crypto = null; + local_crypto = null; + } + this.stream = parent.create_stream(content); rtp_datagram.datagram_received.connect(this.stream.on_recv_rtp_data); rtcp_datagram.datagram_received.connect(this.stream.on_recv_rtcp_data); @@ -118,6 +138,20 @@ public class Xmpp.Xep.JingleRtp.Parameters : Jingle.ContentParameters, Object { } agreed_payload_type = preferred_payload_type; + Gee.List crypto_nodes = description_node.get_deep_subnodes("encryption", "crypto"); + if (crypto_nodes.size == 0) { + warning("Counterpart didn't include any cryptos"); + if (encryption_required) { + return; + } + } else { + Crypto preferred_crypto = Crypto.parse(crypto_nodes[0]); + if (local_crypto.crypto_suite != preferred_crypto.crypto_suite) { + warning("Counterpart's crypto suite doesn't match any of our sent ones"); + } + remote_crypto = preferred_crypto; + } + accept(stream, session, content); } @@ -137,6 +171,10 @@ public class Xmpp.Xep.JingleRtp.Parameters : Jingle.ContentParameters, Object { ret.put_node(payload_type.to_xml()); } } + if (local_crypto != null) { + ret.put_node(new StanzaNode.build("encryption", NS_URI) + .put_node(local_crypto.to_xml())); + } return ret; } } \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/xmpp-vala/src/module/xep/0167_jingle_rtp/jingle_rtp_module.vala b/xmpp-vala/src/module/xep/0167_jingle_rtp/jingle_rtp_module.vala index 35e03168..23aee6c9 100644 --- a/xmpp-vala/src/module/xep/0167_jingle_rtp/jingle_rtp_module.vala +++ b/xmpp-vala/src/module/xep/0167_jingle_rtp/jingle_rtp_module.vala @@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ public abstract class Module : XmppStreamModule { public abstract async Gee.List get_supported_payloads(string media); public abstract async PayloadType? pick_payload_type(string media, Gee.List payloads); + public abstract Crypto? generate_local_crypto(); + public abstract Crypto? pick_remote_crypto(Gee.List cryptos); + public abstract Crypto? pick_local_crypto(Crypto? remote); public abstract Stream create_stream(Jingle.Content content); public abstract void close_stream(Stream stream); @@ -36,6 +39,7 @@ public abstract class Module : XmppStreamModule { // Create audio content Parameters audio_content_parameters = new Parameters(this, "audio", yield get_supported_payloads("audio")); + audio_content_parameters.local_crypto = generate_local_crypto(); Jingle.Transport? audio_transport = yield jingle_module.select_transport(stream, content_type.required_transport_type, content_type.required_components, receiver_full_jid, Set.empty()); if (audio_transport == null) { throw new Jingle.Error.NO_SHARED_PROTOCOLS("No suitable audio transports"); @@ -52,6 +56,7 @@ public abstract class Module : XmppStreamModule { if (video) { // Create video content Parameters video_content_parameters = new Parameters(this, "video", yield get_supported_payloads("video")); + video_content_parameters.local_crypto = generate_local_crypto(); Jingle.Transport? video_transport = yield stream.get_module(Jingle.Module.IDENTITY).select_transport(stream, content_type.required_transport_type, content_type.required_components, receiver_full_jid, Set.empty()); if (video_transport == null) { throw new Jingle.Error.NO_SHARED_PROTOCOLS("No suitable video transports"); @@ -92,6 +97,7 @@ public abstract class Module : XmppStreamModule { if (content == null) { // Content for video does not yet exist -> create it Parameters video_content_parameters = new Parameters(this, "video", yield get_supported_payloads("video")); + video_content_parameters.local_crypto = generate_local_crypto(); Jingle.Transport? video_transport = yield stream.get_module(Jingle.Module.IDENTITY).select_transport(stream, content_type.required_transport_type, content_type.required_components, receiver_full_jid, Set.empty()); if (video_transport == null) { throw new Jingle.Error.NO_SHARED_PROTOCOLS("No suitable video transports"); @@ -148,26 +154,130 @@ public abstract class Module : XmppStreamModule { } public class Crypto { - public string cryptoSuite { get; private set; } - public string keyParams { get; private set; } - public string? sessionParams { get; private set; } - public string? tag { get; private set; } + public const string AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 = "AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80"; + public const string AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32 = "AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32"; + public const string F8_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 = "F8_128_HMAC_SHA1_80"; + + public string crypto_suite { get; private set; } + public string key_params { get; private set; } + public string? session_params { get; private set; } + public string tag { get; private set; } + + public uint8[] key_and_salt { owned get { + if (!key_params.has_prefix("inline:")) return null; + int endIndex = key_params.index_of("|"); + if (endIndex < 0) endIndex = key_params.length; + string sub = key_params.substring(7, endIndex - 7); + return Base64.decode(sub); + }} + + public string? lifetime { owned get { + if (!key_params.has_prefix("inline:")) return null; + int firstIndex = key_params.index_of("|"); + if (firstIndex < 0) return null; + int endIndex = key_params.index_of("|", firstIndex + 1); + if (endIndex < 0) { + if (key_params.index_of(":", firstIndex) > 0) return null; // Is MKI + endIndex = key_params.length; + } + return key_params.substring(firstIndex + 1, endIndex); + }} + + public int mki { get { + if (!key_params.has_prefix("inline:")) return -1; + int firstIndex = key_params.index_of("|"); + if (firstIndex < 0) return -1; + int splitIndex = key_params.index_of(":", firstIndex); + if (splitIndex < 0) return -1; + int secondIndex = key_params.index_of("|", firstIndex + 1); + if (secondIndex < 0) { + return int.parse(key_params.substring(firstIndex + 1, splitIndex)); + } else if (splitIndex > secondIndex) { + return int.parse(key_params.substring(secondIndex + 1, splitIndex)); + } + return -1; + }} + + public int mki_length { get { + if (!key_params.has_prefix("inline:")) return -1; + int firstIndex = key_params.index_of("|"); + if (firstIndex < 0) return -1; + int splitIndex = key_params.index_of(":", firstIndex); + if (splitIndex < 0) return -1; + int secondIndex = key_params.index_of("|", firstIndex + 1); + if (secondIndex < 0 || splitIndex > secondIndex) { + return int.parse(key_params.substring(splitIndex + 1, key_params.length)); + } + return -1; + }} + + public bool is_valid { get { + switch(crypto_suite) { + case AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80: + case AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32: + case F8_128_HMAC_SHA1_80: + return key_and_salt.length == 30; + } + return false; + }} + + public uint8[] key { owned get { + uint8[] key_and_salt = key_and_salt; + switch(crypto_suite) { + case AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80: + case AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32: + case F8_128_HMAC_SHA1_80: + if (key_and_salt.length >= 16) return key_and_salt[0:16]; + break; + } + return null; + }} + + public uint8[] salt { owned get { + uint8[] keyAndSalt = key_and_salt; + switch(crypto_suite) { + case AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80: + case AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32: + case F8_128_HMAC_SHA1_80: + if (keyAndSalt.length >= 30) return keyAndSalt[16:30]; + break; + } + return null; + }} + + public static Crypto create(string crypto_suite, uint8[] key_and_salt, string? session_params = null, string tag = "1") { + Crypto crypto = new Crypto(); + crypto.crypto_suite = crypto_suite; + crypto.key_params = "inline:" + Base64.encode(key_and_salt); + crypto.session_params = session_params; + crypto.tag = tag; + return crypto; + } + + public Crypto rekey(uint8[] key_and_salt) { + Crypto crypto = new Crypto(); + crypto.crypto_suite = crypto_suite; + crypto.key_params = "inline:" + Base64.encode(key_and_salt); + crypto.session_params = session_params; + crypto.tag = tag; + return crypto; + } public static Crypto parse(StanzaNode node) { Crypto crypto = new Crypto(); - crypto.cryptoSuite = node.get_attribute("crypto-suite"); - crypto.keyParams = node.get_attribute("key-params"); - crypto.sessionParams = node.get_attribute("session-params"); + crypto.crypto_suite = node.get_attribute("crypto-suite"); + crypto.key_params = node.get_attribute("key-params"); + crypto.session_params = node.get_attribute("session-params"); crypto.tag = node.get_attribute("tag"); return crypto; } public StanzaNode to_xml() { StanzaNode node = new StanzaNode.build("crypto", NS_URI) - .put_attribute("crypto-suite", cryptoSuite) - .put_attribute("key-params", keyParams); - if (sessionParams != null) node.put_attribute("session-params", sessionParams); - if (tag != null) node.put_attribute("tag", tag); + .put_attribute("crypto-suite", crypto_suite) + .put_attribute("key-params", key_params) + .put_attribute("tag", tag); + if (session_params != null) node.put_attribute("session-params", session_params); return node; } } diff --git a/xmpp-vala/src/module/xep/0167_jingle_rtp/stream.vala b/xmpp-vala/src/module/xep/0167_jingle_rtp/stream.vala index 62d85dec..2fc29291 100644 --- a/xmpp-vala/src/module/xep/0167_jingle_rtp/stream.vala +++ b/xmpp-vala/src/module/xep/0167_jingle_rtp/stream.vala @@ -17,6 +17,20 @@ public abstract class Xmpp.Xep.JingleRtp.Stream : Object { } return null; }} + public JingleRtp.Crypto? local_crypto { get { + var content_params = content.content_params; + if (content_params is Parameters) { + return ((Parameters)content_params).local_crypto; + } + return null; + }} + public JingleRtp.Crypto? remote_crypto { get { + var content_params = content.content_params; + if (content_params is Parameters) { + return ((Parameters)content_params).remote_crypto; + } + return null; + }} public bool sending { get { return content.session.senders_include_us(content.senders); }}